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Lawyers' Agenda for Understanding
Alternative Dispute Resolution
EDWIN H. GREENEBAUM*
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has been an increasingly prominent
feature in the legal profession's consciousness. The motivations for the
increasing attention to ADR are to provide cost-effective ways to respond to
society's (supposedly) increased litigiousness' and to improve the quality of
dispute resolution services that the profession provides.2 While these concerns
with quantity and quality produce tensions within the ADR movement, they
have combined to generate extensive ADR activity in court studies,' in
legislation and court rules, 4 in organizations' and specialized journals,6 in
continuing legal education,7 and in an extensive and extending literature!
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. The reality of court congestion is very controversial.
Hardly a day goes by that we do not hear or read of the dramatic increase in the number
of lawsuits filed, of the latest multimillion verdict, or of another small business, child care
center, or municipal corporation that has had its insurance canceled out from under it
.... [Why?] Because, quite simply, everyone is suing everyone, and most are getting big
money .... [Americans have developed a] mad romance ... with the civil litigation
process.
132 CONG. REc. S948-49 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConneil) (introducing
S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), the Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act), quoted in
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And
Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (1992). But cf Saks, supra, at 1149 ("Much of what we
think we know about the behavior of the tort litigation system is untrue, unknown, or unknowable.");
see also Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 881 (discussing how the
debate over the caseload crisis has usually focused on the increases in areas such as civil rights litigation
since the business-oriented legal profession tends to overlook increases in cases brought by its usual
clients); Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Court, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
115 (1991); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986).
2. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 6-9 (1992).
3. E.g., Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 3.
4. E.g., Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 581 (Supp. III 1991); Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § I (Supp. III 1991); Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (Supp. 1989); IND. R. ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL.; see also
Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REV. 889,
893 n.23, 897-914 (1991) (compiling and discussing several ADR legislative schemes).
5. See A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES DIVISION
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GROUP, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY (1990). A 1992 edition
is currently being compiled.
6. See, for example, Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution, Ohio State Journal on Dispute
Resolution, The Arbitration Journal, and BNA Alternative Dispute Resolution Report. In addition to
academic journals and reporting services, several of the organizations established to support ADR
publish newsletters, such as the A.B.A. Dispute Resolution Alternatives by the Standing Committee on
Dispute Resolution.
7. See, e.g., JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., NAT'L INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: MATERIALS FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (1991).
8. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 489-97 (containing a compilation of sources in its
bibliography); Franklin A. Weston, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Bibliography, 3 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 183 (1989).
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Arbitration and mediation have been a part of specialized legal practices for
a very long time,9 and anthropologists have studied, and told us about, the
variety of ways in which human societies have approached "dispute resolu-
tion" since the founding of that discipline."0 Nevertheless, "most" lawyers'
study and practice of dispute resolution methods have included only litigation
and unassisted negotiation between parties' lawyers." The ambition of this
Essay is to articulate a framework through which those of us needing remedial
education 2 can develop an understanding of ADR.
After discussing "problem solving" as a general matter, I will delineate
conceptions of disputes, examine what constitutes the resolution of disputes,
and survey major categories of dispute resolution methods. I will then
differentiate the characteristics of dispute resolution methods and examine
criteria by which dispute resolution methods should be chosen. Finally, I will
comment on lawyers' agenda for understanding alternative dispute resolution.
I. PROBLEM SOLVING
We usually think of disputes as problems in need of solutions. Since our
need to move from ignorance to learning about ADR is also a problem to be
solved, thinking about problem solving is a good place to begin. As a general
matter, we may solve problems by routine, by problem-solving disciplines,
and by art.
A. Routine Problem Solving
Problem solving is frequently routinized so that recurring problems can be
resolved "by the book," that is, by rules. One may adopt routines to be
efficient, to allow delegation of authority to agents whose judgment one might
9. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, WIDE WORLD OF ARBITRATION: AN ANTHOLOGY
(Charlotte Gold et al. eds., 1978); NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO
MEDIATION AND THE LAW 1-3 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Carol J. Greenhouse, Mediation: A Comparative Approach, 20 MAN: J. ROYAL
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 90 (1985); THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader
et al. eds., 1978).
11. I know of no systematic research that establishes the degree to which this, or the cognate
assertion that lawyers resist ADR, is true, but there are extensive anecdotal assertions. For a
culturallpsychological explanation of lawyers' resistance to more cooperative modes of dispute
resolution, see John Dieffenbach, Psychology, Society and the Development of the Adversarial Posture,
7 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 261 (1992).
12. As I am currently teaching a course in Alternative Dispute Resolution for the first time, I
include myself. I am grateful to the students in the class who are working through these materials with
me, and especially to Benjamin Lo and Michael Turner who are providing research assistance.
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otherwise be unwilling to trust, and to assure the implementation of
authoritative policies and nondiscriminatory problem solving. These
motivations for routinization have justifications. Approaching every problem
as a novelty is expensive. Among the expenses of nonroutine approaches is
investing in problem solvers whose training and experience would allow us
to trust their discretion. Because perceptions differ and values are implicated,
equal treatment and policy implementation are real problems.
But these benefits of routine are accompanied by costs. The inappropriate
application of routine may make the problem more serious and expensive to
resolve. Whether a problem is suitable for routine treatment is itself a problem
to be solved, and if one does not trust the judgment of one's problem solvers,
then rules must be written for screening. While many bureaucracies have such
rules, there is no routine for designing routines.
Routines may be written or unwritten; they may be adopted formally or be
the product of culture. When one is confronted with an unfamiliar problem,
one is likely to look for processes to imitate, and routinized models may make
problem solving feel safer.
B. Disciplined Problem Solving
Where novelty in problems is recognized, problem solving will involve
creativity/imagination, intuition, experimentation, and aesthetics. While
problem solving may be more art than science, the art has foundations in
discipline. We will first articulate the discipline and then witness the art. The
elements of problem-solving discipline are definition, searching, evaluation,
and choice. This may sound like a progression through steps, but the path
does not follow a straight line. 3
1. Defining the Problem
When I ask a group of students to specify the process of problem solving,
"defining the problem" is the aspect likely to be mentioned first. One cannot
solve a problem without understanding its nature. Because problematic
situations frequently are incoherent and have multiple aspects, "defining the
problem" is often itself a difficult problem (to be solved by routine, art, or
13. Compare the model of "creativity" articulated in TERESA M. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIvITY 77-91 (1983) (describing a creativity framework that includes the
following components: task motivation, domain-relevant skills, and creativity-relevant skills). For the
relevance of a similar model to legal education, see Richard K. Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry
into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 725, 744-53 (1989).
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discipline, with greater or lesser resources, patience, and creativity). Not only
do problematic situations come without labels (or with unreliable labels), but
more fundamentally, even a simple problematic situation can be conceived in
diverse ways. The process of definition is likely to be circular.
Take the problem of "urban decay." The matter is. certainly multifaceted,
multicentered, and confusing. There are problems of education, housing, law,
transportation, and urban management, among others. Our tendency is to try
to break large, complex problems into more manageable subproblems, but
adopting such a strategy becomes part of the problem definition. Our goals
and values, and our priorities among them, are also likely to influence our
problem definition. Urban decay is multifaceted and confusing, but if a riot
is in progress, our minds are focused wonderfully, at least for the time being.
Definitions are important thinking tools, but they are confining. Initial
definitions should be provisional.
2. Generating Possible Solutions
Disciplined problem solving involves considering the greatest available
number and diversity of possible solutions, and separating, at least initially,
the process of searching for possibilities from that of evaluating them. This
separation functions to avoid judgmental frames of mind that inhibit the
generation of ideas and to avoid making premature judgments.14 Premature
judgment comes when we are captured by a "good idea." Too often the idea
seems good because it conforms to our biases and stereotypes. And, in any
case, better ideas may yet be discovered. One can generate possibilities
through research, brainstorming, and play. The most productive searches are
likely to include all three.
Lawyers are most likely to rely on research, looking for prior solutions to
the same or similar problems (precedents). We are too likely to rely on
precedents, both for the definition of the problem and its solution, and to
settle for the first plausible precedents that come to our attention.
Brainstorming is the uninhibited generation of ideas through free associa-
tion, through following trains of thought wherever they may lead, and through
exploring the most tangential analogies. One lets bad ideas come with good
ones, not only to avoid turning off the flow, but also because early in the
process we may not be good judges of quality and because the best solution
may turn out to be constructed from pieces of bad ones. One can productively
14. This is an aspect of teaching law students "to think like lawyers" in which legal education is
not very successful. See Edwin H. Greenebaum, How Professionals (Including Legal Educators) "Treat"
Their Clients, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 554, 563-66 (1987).
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brainstorm both in private reverie and in bouncing ideas off others in groups.
The process may continue unconsciously when one takes a break or turns
conscious attention to other matters.
Adults, as well as children, can learn from play. One of the reasons "role
playing" is a useful pedagogical device is that participants discover aspects
of the simulated situation through experiencing its drama. Adults' creativity
is too often constricted by an "unwillingness" to indulge in play as a part of
work, making work both less fun and less productive.
Research, brainstorming, and play support each other. Brainstorming and
play are, indeed, hard to separate. And ideas generated in brainstorming and
play may lead to productive research, just as material found in research may
be the starting point for brainstorming and play.
3. Evaluating Possible Solutions
One commences evaluating possible solutions when the sources for
additional possibilities seem exhausted, when time and other resource
constraints require moving on, or when one judges that the marginal utility of
new ideas does not justify investment in further searching (violating the
principle of separating generation from evaluation). Moving on does not leave
possibility generation behind; new ideas will emerge in the process of
evaluation. When to commence evaluation is a matter of judgment. The
inexperienced and impatient frequently begin evaluation too soon. The very
experienced may be more flexible, relying more on reiteration.' 5 In any case,
at some point the time for evaluation arrives.
Making choices involves applying values to perceptions of facts, including
our understanding of history, of present circumstances, and of the social and
natural systems upon which our predictions depend.' 6 To judge the benefits
and costs of possible solutions, then, one must identify and assess factual
uncertainties and clarify one's conflicting values (including tolerance of risks)
as one is confronted by the problem and its possible solutions. Where the
choice of a solution must be made or accepted by a client or a group,
assessing factual uncertainties and clarifying values are more than an
individual matter.'7 The degree to which uncertainty should be eliminated
and clarification achieved as predicates for making a choice is yet another
problem.
15. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
16. See Edwin H. Greenebaum, "Understanding ... ": Processing Information and Values in
Clinical Work, I I J. LEGAL PROF. 103 (1986).
17. See GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHics IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 43-67 (1978).
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The tools of evaluation are research and experimentation. Research may get
us data that will reduce factual uncertainty, in some cases to practical
certainty (the kinds of facts of which courts take judicial notice). And the
accounts of others who have confronted relevant value issues may assist us
in clarifying our own. Or we may find that there have been authoritative
determinations that constrain the choices available to us.
Much of our experimentation is done through models. We frequently do this
mentally, running possibilities through the models of social, economic, and
natural systems we carry in our minds. One can experiment in some situations
with game-playing simulations. Sometimes, computerized models may be
used."8 And one can sometimes experiment by trial runs of a solution in the
actual situation. Whatever methods of evaluation we use, our problem solving
is an intervention in the situation and is, to some degree, changing the
problem as we seek to solve it.
The diverse cognitive styles of different problem solvers will each have
advantages and disadvantages for generating possibilities and for evaluating
them. The logical analysis of linear thinkers will leave no, stone unturned
following a path of inquiry. Associational/gestalt thinkers will see possibilities
and implications not available to the more focused among us. Problem-solving
teams of individuals with complementary aptitudes may be better able to
create or find the best solutions, but professions and firms of problem solvers
may tend to attract, and value, "like-minded" groups.
4. Branching and Reiteration
Each possible definition of the problem will lead to multiple possible
solutions, each of which will need to be evaluated through research and
experimentation by assessing various understandings of the facts, as judged
according to various weightings of our conflicting values, before the best
definition of the problem may be selected with confidence. Not only will this
branching lead in many directions, but at each stage we may encounter ideas
or data that may prompt us to loop back to an earlier stage and follow yet
more new paths. Our exploration of definitions, goals, strategies, solutions,
and evaluations will interact in our minds, if we let them. To say the least,
disciplined problem solving is not straightforward. Resource constraints will
truncate problem solving in all but the simplest situations, requiring good
judgment in problem-solving "triage."
18. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation,




The time comes to make a choice and act on it. This may occur when a
convincingly good solution is found or when time and other resources run out.
In any case, whether a choice is a commitment or merely an experiment is a
matter of degree. The law's ambivalent precedents on reopening judgments for
newly discovered evidence and modifying decrees for changed circumstances
are a formal instance of the general issue. Developing judgment regarding
making commitments is a significant aspect of maturity. It is a comfort that
many decisions made under constraints may be revisited. Understanding where
one stands, and what to do about it, is always a problem needing a solution.
C. Problem Solving as an Art
Artistic mastery is acquired with discipline, and artists never leave their
disciplines fully behind. Experienced practitioners of problem-solving arts
reflect on their work in progress, allowing the work to speak back to them.
The inexperienced learn problem-solving arts in part by acquiring information
and rules (learning the discipline), but in larger measure by witnessing models
of and receiving guidance from experienced practitioners. These processes are
exemplified by the architect whose work and teaching are described by
Donald Schon in The Reflective Practitioner:
In the medium of sketch and spatial-action language, [Quist, the archi-
tect/teacher,] represents buildings on the site through moves which are also
experiments. Each move has consequences described and evaluated in terms
drawn from one or more design domains. And each creates new problems
to be described and solved. Quist designs by spinning out a web of moves,
consequences, implications, appreciations, and further moves....
Each move is a local experiment which contributes to the global
experiment of reframing the problem. Some moves are resisted (the shapes
cannot be made to fit the contours), while others generate new phenomena.
As Quist reflects on the unexpected consequences and implications of his
moves, he listens to the situation's back talk, forming new appreciations
which guide his further moves .... Out of his refraining of [the student's]
problem, Quist derives a problem he can solve and a coherent organization
of materials from which he can make something that he likes. ...
... In [Quist's] unfailing virtuosity, he gives no hint of detecting and
correcting errors in his own performance. He zeroes in immediately on
fundamental schemes and decisions which quickly acquire the status of
commitments. He compresses and perhaps masks the process by which
designers learn from iterations of moves which lead them to reappreciate,
reinvent, and redraw. But this may be because he has developed a very
good understanding of and feeling for what he calls "the problem of this
problem."... But Quist reflects very little on his own reflection-in-action,
1993]
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and it would be easy for a student or observer to miss the fundamental
structure of inquiry which underlies his virtuoso performance.1 9
Lawyers acquire problem-solving habits, good and bad, in their developing
years, and then learn problem solving as it applies to "legal" matters in
practice. The models and instructors they encounter in practice will them-
selves have developed varying degrees of virtuosity. We are too likely to
believe we can move from our life-long habits to becoming artists without
attention to discipline. Problem-solving skills are important for most aspects
of legal work. They are critical to effective dispute resolution.
II. RESOLVING DISPUTES
A. What Is a Dispute?
The question, "what is a dispute?," should be understood as, "what are the
various phenomena that can be thought of as a dispute?" Because the idea of
dispute implies something in contention, "dispute" and "problem" are not
synonymous. This section will articulate some conceptions of "dispute." They
are not mutually exclusive, and any contentious situation is likely to be a
dispute in multiple senses. Answers to the questions, "when is a dispute
resolved?" and "what constitutes the resolution of a dispute?", will be a
function of the prevailing conception of dispute.
1. Conflicting Assertions/Claims of Legal Rights. We lawyers are so familiar
with these (and their range of possibilities), that this idea of dispute tends to
dominate our "analysis" when we are "thinking like lawyers." (We should
distinguish conflicting claims of legal rights from disagreements regarding
"what is the law" in some matter, which falls in my third conception below.)
2. Conflicts of Wills (Desires, Intentions). Consider two children quarreling
over a toy. Depending on their development, they may rationalize their
positions by claims of right, but the underlying matter is a conflict of
"wants." Conflicts of wills are resolved when disputants' wills are modified
or when circumstances effect a disengagement (for example, the children are
sent to their rooms). A definitive resolution of a question of legal rights may
not resolve parties' conflict of wills.




3. Argument/Disagreement. For example, "when does life begin?," or "what
is 'the right to bear arms'?" It is this sense of dispute that dominates
dictionary definitions.2"
4. Unsettled Relationships. Marital and labor management disputes are, only
most obviously, likely to be this kind of dispute in some of their aspects.
5. Conflicting Views/Intentions Regarding Future Relations. In this
conception, a version of unsettled relations, the dispute may be formal (for
example, in contract negotiation) or informal (for example, a dating couple
breaking up because only one of them wants to continue).
6. Opportunities for Growth and Increased Understanding. Disputes (and
problems generally) may create opportunities for those immediately involved
and for their communities (large and small). Development of the law (through
precedent and legislative response) is the opportunity side of litigation. The
opportunity for community development is one of the principal tenets of the
community dispute resolution component of the ADR movement.2
7. Parties to the Dispute, Including Determining the Groups Involved. The
disputing parties may frequently be conceived in multiple ways in a
contentious situation.22
One may well be considering at this point what aspects of disputes are of
concern to lawyers, an issue we can only touch upon in this Essay. We may
note, however, that one source of dissatisfaction with our profession's dispute
resolution services is that we may focus too much on one dispute aspect of
contentious situations, leaving other aspects of disputes unresolved or, worse,
aggravated.
B. Generating Dispute Resolution Possibilities
Our search for dispute resolution possibilities should branch to consider the
various ideas of disputes, but space limitations prevent following all the paths.
Identifying or defining dispute resolution devices is not the same as
structuring possible dispute resolution strategies, in which one may consider
20. E.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 655 (1986) (defining "dispute" as
"verbal controversy; strife .... ,).
21. See Raymond Shonholz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work Structure, and Guiding
Principles, 5 MED. Q. 3, 13-16 (1984) ("[T]he expression of hostilities and differences within the
community serves to inform and educate, which creates a base for greater understanding and mutual
work between disputants."), reprinted in JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL, PROCESS OF DIsPUrE RESOLUTION:
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 274, 275 (1989).
22. Cf. HAZARD, supra note 17 (describing circumstances where attorneys have difficulty discerning
to whom they owe a professional duty and in what situations).
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questions of sequence and timing, manner of communication, and the use of
multiple devices.
Argument/disagreement may be resolved by learning processes through
which one party persuades the other or in which the disputants achieve a
shared understanding that differs from the initial position of either. Education-
al methods range from coercive (brainwashing) to voluntary, collaborative
possibilities.2 3 Sometimes disputants may accept an authoritative resolution
(for example, relying on a dictionary or almanac, or on the professor teaching
the course). Sometimes authority will be accepted if the parties have had an
opportunity to present arguments. And sometimes they will accept a resolution
for limited purposes. (For purposes of the examination, the professor declares
the truth.)
For interpersonal/relational conflict, there are many schools of counsel-
ing/therapy through which the parties may relearn or adjust their roles and
relationships to ones that are mutually satisfying, or at least acceptable. Or
alternatively the solution may be disengagement or separation.
Viewing dispute resolution as the settling of legal status, several methods
of dispute resolution are available. I will address this area more fully, sorting
dispute resolution possibilities by major categories.
1. Negotiation/Conlract. Parties may resolve "legal" disputes by negotiating
settlement contracts, 24 assuming they are competent in law to enter the
contract. 25 Devices in which neutral, disinterested third parties facilitate
settlement are known, generally, as mediation. Other devices that have been
created to facilitate settlement are fact finding, mini-trial, summary jury trial,
and ombudsmen.26
23. See Greenebaum, supra note 14, at 573-75.
24. Disputed claims of right can also be lost through waiver, which strictly understood is a
voluntary change of position without consideration. Waiver, thus, is an exception to the requirement of
consideration in contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b (1981).
25. In addition to general issues of competence, such as minority and mental incapacity, there are
issues of specific competence regarding whether an individual may enter specific contracts that affect
settlements. For example, contracts between fiduciaries and their beneficiaries and clients are reviewable
for fairness. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173(a) (1981) (discussing when contract
voidable for abuse of fiduciary relationship).
26. In a "mini-trial," a neutral presides over counsel who present abbreviated versions of their cases
to the senior management representatives of both parties who will negotiate a settlement. In a "summary
jury trial," counsel present summary versions of their cases to a jury which gives an advisory decision
which counsel can then consider in settlement negotiation. "Ombudsmen" act as fact finders and
promote settlement through counseling and mediation. JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE




2. Adjudication. In adjudication, the parties present evidence and argument
to a neutral third party who is authorized to make a decision that is binding27
on the parties. The process is initiated by the parties and the adjudicator
responds.28 Litigation resulting in a judgment by a court is the dominant
example in our legal system.2 9 Arbitration is usually thought of as a private
variation on this theme, but parties are bound to arbitral judgments because
they have so agreed, and arbitration has its roots in, and its scope is measured
by, contract.3 °
3. Legislation. Disputants may persuade lawmakers to enact rules that will
resolve matters for the future.
4. Executive Action. When children quarrel over their toys, parents may
dispose of the matter by decree. Parents may listen to argument, but they are
not bound to do so. There are circumstances in which police, employers,
teachers, and other authorities have similar powers, sometimes because
disputants have so authorized them.
Governmental adjudicative, legislative, and executive actions, of course,
occur in administrative agencies as well as in the three constitutional
branches.
5. Fault and Default. When parties delay too long in pressing their claims,
their legal rights may be settled by statutes of limitation or by laches. If they
have created appearances having legal implications on which others have,
relied, their legal claim may be foreclosed by estoppel. If they fail to litigate
according to the rules, courts' judgments may be based on default rather than
adjudication.
6. Chance/Contest. Two friends each claim to be the first to have seen a
dollar bill abandoned on the street. They could agree to resolve the matter by
each getting fifty cents, but they might resort to a device of chance. Recently,
Southwest Airlines and Stevens Aviation each were using the phrase "Plane
Smart" in their advertising. The CEOs of the two airline companies gained
27. That is, usually binding. While courts do not render advisory judgments, nonbinding
"arbitration" is possible.
28. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353
(1978) (discussing social and structural constraints on the process of adjudication).
29. A substantial portion of the world's legal systems follow "civil law" traditions which have an
"inquisitorial" variation on the adjudication theme familiar to us. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 167-74,180-81 (1985); MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 91-96 (1982).
30. Another innovation in adjudication is the "private judge," which occurs within the framework
of litigation when the parties hire and compensate a qualified private judge to expedite the processing
of their case. See e.g., IND. R. ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. 1.3(E), 6.1-6.5.
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notoriety by agreeing to resolve their conflicting claims to the slogan by arm
wrestling for it.3
7. Self-help. In some instances, the law sanctions self-help, for example, in
the reclamation of property.32 Sometimes activity that is lawful for one
purpose may have collateral self-help effects, for example, exercising free
speech in circumstances that have coercive effect. Sometimes self-help
activity is illegal, but politics, economics, or other practicalities constrain law
enforcement.
C. Characteristics of Dispute Resolution Methods
The many possible variations on the major themes articulated in the
previous section cannot be appreciated without surveying the characteristics
of dispute resolution methods. Take a deep breath:
1. Scope of Dispute to be Resolved
What aspects of a contentious situation does the dispute resolution device
focus on or give priority to?
2. Timing
When is the dispute resolution device chosen? Dispute resolution devices
may be selected before disputes arise as part of contracts governing
continuing relations (constitutions, articles, bylaws, leases, and so forth) or as
part of a contract governing a single transaction, or the device may be
selected after a dispute has arisen. Sometimes the device is prescribed by
statute, court rule, or by other rules outside the parties' control.
3. Financing the Dispute Resolution Process
Are the resources for dispute resolution furnished by the parties, subsidized
by the public or a charity, or funded by insurance? Do those paying the piper
have a role in composing the tune?
31. Entertaining accounts of the denouement are contained in Real Men Don't Litigate, INC., May
1992, at 13; Bill Freeman, Kelleher KOd: 'Malice in Dallas' Match Leaves Lawyers in the Lurch, 29
AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, May 1992, at 112; Southwest Airlines, 54 WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, March 23,
1992, at 126.
32. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978).
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4. Parties, Representatives, and Neutrals:
Their Roles and How They Are Chosen
Do the disputants have the assistance of a third-party neutral to resolve their
dispute? If so, is the neutral a professional of some kind, one with knowledge
of the subject matter, an acquaintance or a stranger, one with authority from
a significant group to which the disputants belong, a single individual or a
group? Are neutrals chosen by the parties or in accordance with a procedure
agreed to by the parties, provided or designated by a public or private
institution, or chosen in accordance with an institution's or government's
rules? Neutrals' roles are a matter of contract between the disputants and the
neutral, if not determined by law or other controlling institution, and will be
a function of the chosen dispute processing method.
Do the disputants act on their own or with assistance? Is the one providing
assistance a professional (a lawyer or other) for whom the disputant is a
client, a friend, or someone provided by a group of which the disputant is a
member? Is the assistance chosen or hired by the disputant or provided or
assigned by an institution? If the disputants have assistance, do they speak for
themselves, with advice and support, or through representatives? If through
representatives, are the disputants present or absent?
5. Coercion
Is participation coerced or voluntary? In coercive dispute resolution,
participation is involuntary with a binding result. Beyond what the law
permits by way of self-help and executive action, coercive dispute resolution
is limited by constitutional requirements of due process and separation of
powers to litigation and administrative processes with judicial review.
Coercive dispute resolution is also limited in form to settling legal claims.
Parties may be required to participate in ADR procedures, but they may not
then be required to accept the results.33
33. This general principle is a function of the separation of powers, the requirements of due process,
and the right to jury trial. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that court rules may place sanctions,
such as costs or attorneys' fees, on parties who do not obtain better results from litigation than those
they have been offered in court-annexed ADR. Dayton, supra note 4, at 900-01, 952-56; cf. FED. R. Ctv.
P. 68 (detailing "offer ofjudgment" provisions that require a party who has declined a settlement offer
to pay costs incurred after the rejection of such offer if the judgment ultimately rendered is not more
favorable to the rejecting party than the earlier offer it declined).
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6. Dispute Processing Method
Where the process is negotiation or mediation, do the parties bargain in
adversarial/positional or in collaborative/interests-oriented modes?34 Does a
mediator operate as a communications facilitator (go-between, clarifier), a
counselor (helping the parties to see reality and to change their positions), or
an advisor (recommending outcomes)?
Whether the process is negotiation/mediation or adjudication: Is the
procedure formal, rule-governed, and elaborate, or is it informal, ad hoc, and
simple? Is it chosen by the parties or prescribed by a public or private
institution? Is the result to be governed by "law," by rules or customs of a
private community, by the terms of the parties' contract or principles inferred
from the content of their relationship, or by what the neutral thinks best for
the parties and/or the community?
What is the product of the dispute resolution process? Does it declare rights,
provide compensation, or order specific behavior for the future? Is the result
binding or only advisory?
Are the process and the results public or private?
Arbitration and mediation are two steps along a continuum from litigation
to unassisted negotiation between the parties. Moving from litigation to
arbitration maintains the feature of a binding result determined by a third
party, but nevertheless moves from public to private dispute resolution.
Litigation is public in every sense: the institutions, the procedures, the
substantive criteria governing the outcome, the decision maker, and the
finances are supplied by the public. The process occurs in public view, and
the results are public record. Arbitration need not be public in any of these
respects. Even the criteria governing decision may be provided by the parties'
contract or be those of a private community that the parties have chosen to
govern their relationship. Arbitration results are limited only by the same
criteria of legality that would limit their choices in unassisted settlement
negotiation. Mediation removes the feature of a neutral determining the result
in favor of party determination, but retains third-party facilitation (and that
facilitation may still carry influence).
ADR is contract-based, "design-your-own" dispute resolution, limited only
by what contracts the law may determine to be illegal, or unenforceable by
34. For a discussion of negotiation models, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View
of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
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particular remedies.35 The choices are not limited to "pure" mediation or
arbitration. Rather, the defining characteristics identified above yield
innumerable permutations of dispute resolution possibilities. Further, the
content of ADR agreements, like other contracts, may be determined by the
parties' course of conduct pursuant to the agreement, giving meaning to,
supplementing, or modifying their explicit contract. Understanding dispute
resolution devices as they actually operate, therefore, requires close examina-
tion of behavior rather than just the surface forms to which parties apparently
agree, or, indeed, what the law apparently sanctions.36
D. By What Criteria Should Dispute
Resolution Methods Be Chosen?
1. Constraints
While the permutations of variable characteristics surveyed above give rise
to thousands of possible ADR combinations, the available possibilities will be
substantially constrained.
First, there are legal constraints. Some choices may be positively prohibited
or legally difficult to negotiate, and courts sometimes meet others with
inhospitable attitudes, which makes their use hazardous and unpredictable.
Just as one needs to study civil procedure to understand the legal dimensions
of litigation, one must study Alternative Dispute Resolution to understand
legal constraints on alternative methods of settlement.
Resource constraints are more limiting, however, than legal ones. For
particular parties and circumstances, a particular dispute resolution method
may be too costly in time, delay, or finance. The services required for a
particular method may not be available.
Less obvious are resource constraints in negotiating dispute resolution
agreements. Choosing among standard dispute resolution packages will have
advantages over starting from scratch, especially where the methods under
consideration involve neutrals, making it a three-party negotiation. The
advantages of choosing a dispute resolution method available from an
established dispute-resolution provider include: a set of rules, precedents
amplifying the rules' meanings, an institution providing administrative
services, readily available who are neutrals competent to perform the role
35. Thus, "alternative dispute resolution" should, strictly speaking, be understood as "alternative
methods of settlement."
36. One cannot know, for example, what goes on in pre-trial conferences just by studying the
governing rule, FED. R. CIv. P. 16.
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required for the particular method, and, to varying degrees, a tested legal
status. The courts provide this for litigation, as does the American Arbitration
Association (and some other organizations) for arbitration and a greater
variety of institutions for mediation and related methods.
In addition to the obvious negotiation efficiencies of taking a dispute
resolution package off the shelf, consider that, without these packages, parties
who are already in dispute, and who may not trust each other, will have to
reach agreement on a great many details, the choice of which may give
advantage to one or the other, increasing the hazard of further damaging their
relationship. Established packages invite parties' trust in~methods with the
legitimacy and apparent reliability that comes with a track record. Finally,
where the method chosen involves a neutral, individuals competent and
willing to work as neutrals in idiosyncratic ways without the support of
established rules and institutions may be difficult to find. Working with
neutrals in conventional methods provides greater assurance of competency
and of understood ethical constraints. Otherwise, negotiations with neutrals
may be expensive.
Resourceful professionals, however, should test the reality of perceived
constraints. Dispute resolution providers may be willing to play variations on
familiar themes; some may welcome the opportunity. Lawyers advising their
clients regarding dispute resolution methods will feel constrained by their
knowledge and competency, but these may be expanded through research and
development, viewed as an investment in know-how rather than as a cost that
must be charged to an immediate client. In some instances, the potential
advantages of creating a dispute resolution device tailored to the needs of a
dispute may outweigh the risks of innovation. And greater experience will
increase competence in judging and minimizing risks.
2. Parties' Interests
Lawyers' traditional viewpoint is that the choice of a dispute resolution
method is to be made in the client's best interest, but there is some confusion
regarding who is to do the choosing. The choice of a dispute resolution
method is a prime example of the entanglement of means and objectives.37
Identifying objectives and -ranking their priority determines the means, and
one cannot do the best possible job of identification and ranking without
exploring the implications of the available means. At the same time, the
principle of client autonomy will be in tension with lawyers' concerns that
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
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their clients understand the implications of the choices they are making, that
is, that they are acting competently.3"
Each of the defining characteristics of dispute resolution methods identified
in the previous section will have implications for clients' interests. Whoever
does the choosing, identifying the aspects of a dispute on which to focus will
be important. In particular contentious situations, some aspects of a dispute
may be more resolvable than othOers, and this may affect priorities for
investing in dispute resolution resources. Clients' interests will turn on matters
such as: expedition and costs, the relative importance of gaining advantage
and fostering relationships, the costs and benefits of maintaining privacy or
going public, which decision maker will inspire trust and seem legitimate,
what competencies are desirable in the decision maker, what process will
provide the best psychological payoff, and what will work.
3. Professionals' Interests
Lawyers have legitimate professional interests implicated in dispute
resolution choices. They have interests in being honest and moral persons who
do not cause unnecessary harm, either to clients or others. They have craft
interests in their competent and artful practices and in their reputations. They
have interests in providing services at costs clients can afford while earning
a reasonable profit. Conflicts of interests between lawyers and clients in such
matters are inevitable. While the interests of lawyers and clients in choosing
dispute resolution methods will coincide in many respects, clients will be
well-advised to take an active interest themselves in considering dispute
resolution approaches.
4. Public Interests
Public policy in dispute resolution is expressed through limitations on which
dispute resolution contracts are legal and enforceable and on how they may
be entered.39 However, such limitations only control "easy" cases, and some
commentators criticize ADR methods as too likely to sacrifice public
38. See id. at 10 (defining "consult" as "communication of information reasonably sufficient to
permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter"); id. Rule 1.14.
39. With regard to arbitration, this is a matter in which the Supreme Court has been especially
active in recent years. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Gilmer v. Insterstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111
S. CL 1647 (1991).
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interests40 or to sanction coercion or manipulation of individuals to "volun-
tarily" give up rights and protection to which the law entitles them.4' Only
recently have the ADR roles and responsibilities of neutrals, professionals
representing clients, and the courts received sustained attention.42 While
ADR has yet to create an ideal dispute resolution world, the traditional
approaches to dispute resolution are subject to the same criticism because they
do not always prevent overreaching and the sacrifice of public interests.
III. LAWYERS' AGENDA FOR UNDERSTANDING ADR
To the extent that lawyers' duties to provide competent representation43
have come to include knowledge and skills regarding ADR, the job descrip-
tion of "lawyer" has acquired new dimensions.
First, lawyers need to acquire the same kind of knowledge of arbitration,
mediation, and other ADR methods that their study of civil and criminal
procedure has provided them for litigation. That is, lawyers should acquaint
themselves with ADR methods and acquire knowledge of the legal frame-
works in which they operate.
Second, lawyers should be able to counsel clients in the design and choice
of dispute resolution methods. Legal education has given too little attention
to development of the problem-solving competencies touched on in this Essay,
either in law school or in continuing education. To the extent problem solving
is viewed as something lawyers and clients should do collaboratively, this
aspect of ADR work will prompt reexamination of lawyer-client relations.
Further, lawyers may become more aware of how disputed legal claims relate
to other aspects of clients' problems and become more responsible for the
consequences their representation has for aspects of contentious situations
beyond the narrowly legal. As a by-product, lawyers may be better able to
40. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
41. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power,
40 BUFF. L. REv. 441 (1992); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact
of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984). The concern with
coercion may be greatest in institutional arrangements, such as in court-annexed ADR, where mediators
may feel a need to maintain an adequate settlement rate to secure their employment.
42. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983); A.B.A. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTES (A.B.A. Family Law Section 1984); CODE OF ETHICS
FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1977); ETHICAL STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution 1986), reprinted in STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 521-26 (1993).
For examples of academic commentary, see Judith Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case
for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991); Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice
and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 35 (1991).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
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solve the problem of being lawyers and good people, in the view of others
(clients and the public) and themselves.
Third, ADR confronts lawyers with an expanded developmental agenda in
representational skills. In every negotiation, there is a negotiation over the
process as well as the (usually) more obvious one over substance. Lawyers,
however, are not as aware and considerate as they should be regarding the
choices available in negotiating the process of negotiation. Some commenta-
tors observe that lawyers too infrequently negotiate productive problem-
solving processes with "opposing" parties. 44 Fortunately, this is an aspect of
the ADR agenda that is receiving pedagogical attention in both law schools
and continuing education. By the same token, ignorance in this regard is
becoming less excusable. Much more difficult is finding opportunities to learn
representational skills in ADR methods beyond bipolar negotiation. There is
little "clinical" training in these aspects of mediation and arbitration, and
because these methods have been confined largely to specialty practices, few
senior lawyers are available as models. Ironically, it is probably easier to find
training as a neutral in mediation and arbitration than it is to be trained as a
representative in those processes.
This agenda is challenging, but pursuing it will be rewarding. Since clients,
our professional institutions, and professional competition will soon demand
ADR competencies, neglect of these matters is not somethifig we can afford.
44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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